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SCOPE OF THE CONTEMPT POWER: CONSTITUTION
PROTECTS SHERIFF'S NEWSPAPER RELEASE
DECRYING GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION
Wood v. Georgia
370 U.S. 375 (1962)
During a local political campaign, the Superior Court of Bibb County,
Georgia, instructed a state grand jury to investigate an alleged "inane and
inexplicable pattern of Negro bloc voting"' in the county and to recommend
appropriate legislation or prosecution. To publicize the investigation the
judge requested that reporters for local news media be present in the court-
room when the charge was delivered. Petitioner, an elected sheriff of Bibb
County and an announced candidate for re-election, questioned the propriety
of the investigation and was subsequently convicted by the Superior Court
on three counts of contempt. The first count was based on a press release in
which petitioner urged citizens to note that the jury charge constituted "race
agitation" and "a crude attempt at judicial intimidation of Negro voters and
leaders" and was comparable to "intimidation by physical demonstration
such as used by the K.K.K."2 The second count was based on a letter given
to the court bailiff and made available to the grand jury at petitioner's re-
quest. In the letter petitioner criticized the court's charge and advised an
investigation of the Bibb County Democratic Executive Committee. One
month thereafter, petitioner was cited for contempt on the ground that the
press release and the letter interfered with the investigation and constituted
an obstruction to the administration of justice., Petitioner responded to the
contempt citation with a second press release in which he repeated the charges
of the first press release and asserted that his defense to the contempt citation
would be the truth of those charges. The third contempt citation was based
on this second press release. The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the
convictions on the first and third counts and reversed on the second count.4
1 Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 377 n.2 (1962).
2 Id. at 379.
3 Ga. Const. art. 1, § 1, 1 XX, provides: "The power of the Courts to punish for
contempt shall be limited by legislative acts."
Ga. Code Ann. § 24-105, provides:
The power of the several courts to issue attachments and inflict summary
punishment for contempt of court shall extend only to cases of misbehavior of
any person or persons in the presence of said courts or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice, the misbehavior of any of the officers of
said courts in their official transactions, and the disobedience or resistance by any
officer of said courts, party, juror, witness, or other person or persons to any
lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of the said courts . . ..
The Georgia Supreme Court has repeatedly held that courts created by the Georiga
Constitution have inherent power to define and punish contempts, and this power is
not limited by Ga. Code Ann. § 24-105. See Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. State,
216 Ga. 399, 402-403, 116 S.E.2d 580, 583 (1960).
4 Wood v. State, 103 Ga. App. 305, 119 S.E.2d 261 (1961).
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The Georgia Supreme Court, without opinion, declined to review the decision
of the court of appeals. On a writ of certiorari the United States Supreme
Court reversed the convictions on the first and third counts.5 In the opinion
of the Court, delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Warren, the convictions abridged
petitioner's right of freedom of speech as protected by the first and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution. Mr. justice Harlan, with
whom Mr. Justice Clark joined, wrote a dissenting opinion. Justices Frank-
furter and White took no part in the decision of the case.
The scope of the contempt power available to the state judiciaries is
at issue in Wood v. Georgia; in this respect the issue in Wood is similar to
that faced by the Court in Bridges v. California,6 Pennekamp v. Florida,7
and Craig v. Harney.8 The problem in each of these cases has been to deter-
mine the extent to which the courts may inhibit freedom of speech and of
the press in order to protect the orderly and fair administration of justice. In
the Bridges, Pennekamp, and Craig cases, the Court considered only the
problem of comment on cases pending before a court and awaiting dispo-
sition.9 Again in Wood no attempt is made to delimit the full socpe of the
contempt power;' 0 the decision is restricted to grand juries, and the Court
expressly declines "to consider the variant factors that would be present in
a case involving a petit jury."'-
Wood is like Craig, and unlike Bridges and Pennekamp, in that the court
below judged petitioner's conduct to be contemptuous in terms of a consti-
tutionally accepted standard. The Georgia courts found that petitioner's
acts "constituted a clear, present, or imminent danger or serious threat to
the administration of justice .... ,,12 This finding conforms to the standard
which was developed by the Supreme Court in sedition cases13 and which
has been applied to the conflict between free speech and the fair administra-
tion of justice since the Bridges case. The majority and the dissenters in
Wood agree that the clear and present danger standard should be applied
to petitioner's statements; they disagree as to whether the danger exists.
The principal feature which distinguishes Wood from either Bridges,
5 Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
6 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
7 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
8 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
9 Id. at 373.
10 Wood, supra note 5, 385 n.8.
11 Id. at 389. A similar case involving a petit jury has not yet been decided by
the Court, but see the opinion of Mr. justice Frankfurter respecting the denial of a
petition for a writ of certiorari in Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S.
912 (1950).
12 Wood v. State, supra note 4, at 321, 119 S.E.2d at 273.
13 The "clear and present danger" doctrine was originated by Mr. justice Holmes
in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, at 52 (1919). See also Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, at 630 (1919) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); and Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, at 378-79 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Pennekamp, or Craig is the nature of the judicial proceeding involved. In
the latter three cases the allegedly contemptuous out-of-court statements were
directed at a judge; in each case the state court held that the statements
interfered with the judge in his administration of justice, and in each case
the Supreme Court found that the judge ought not to have been unduly
influenced enough to justify curtailment of freedom of speech and of the
press. In Wood the state court found petitioner in contempt for interfering
with the deliberations of a grand jury. This distinguishing point provides
what the dissenters feel is the most compelling reason for affirming the con-
tempt convictions. While the minority treats the Bibb County grand jury
investigation as if it were a pending judicial proceeding, it is unclear just
what sort of proceeding the majority felt was pending. It is the majority
analysis that "there was no 'judicial proceeding pending' in the sense that
prejudice might result to one litigant or the other by ill-considered mis-
conduct aimed at influencing the outcome of a trial or a grand jury pro-
ceeding,"'14 but at no point does the majority attempt affirmatively to charac-
terize what was pending in the Bibb County grand jury room; and it seems
that a decision as to what the proceeding was should be a necessary antecedent
to any determination of whether petitioner's statements constituted a clear
and present danger to the administration of justice.
The dissenters argue that "the grand jury is an integral part of the
judicial process,"' 15 and the grand jury proceeding was a trial inasmuch as
"the state as well as the individual is entitled to a day in court."'16 The
minority concluded that " 'political interest' cannot be used as an excuse for
affecting the result of a judicial inquiry."'17 If the minority analysis is
correct, perhaps contempt should lie against petitioner for his out-of-court
statements. The State's day in court was before a jury of laymen rather
than the independent judges found in Bridges, Pennekainp, and Craig-judges
described in Craig as "men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate."' 8
The dissenters suggest an analogy between the attitude of the Georgia courts
in the principal case and the protection from extrajudicial communications
accorded by statute to federal grand jurors.'9 If the Bibb County grand
jury investigation may accurately be characterized as a "trial," it may also
be proper to characterize petitioner's statements as a clear and present
14 Wood, supra note 5, at 389.
15 Wood, supra note 5, at 397 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
16 Id. at 398.
17 Id. at 404.
18 Craig, supra note 8, at 376.
19 15 U.S.C. § 1504, "Whoever attempts to influence the action or decision of any
grand or petit juror of any court of the United States upon any issue or matter pending
before such juror, or before the jury of which he is a member, or pertaining to his
duties, by writing or sending to him any communication, in relation to such issue or
matter, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than six months, or
both. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the communication of a request
to appear before the grand jury." See Duke v. United States, 90 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1937).
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danger to the administration of justice and, therefore, contemptuous of the
court. "Legal trials are not like elections, to be won through the use of
the meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspaper.1
20
What is the function of a grand jury? The historical function of the
grand jury was "to stand between the prosecutor and the accused and to
determine whether the charge was founded upon credible testimony or was
dictated by malice or personal ill will."2 1 This was clearly a judicial function.
But the function of the grand jury has been, and still is, changing. Wide-
spread use of the preliminary examination has led to the decline of the grand
jury; the preliminary examination is less expensive and more expeditious
and affords potentially a greater protection for the accused.2 2 The grand jury
has emerged in a new role as an investigatory body searching generally into
matters of public corruption and immorality 3 The present-day function of
the grand jury has been compared to the function of a legislative investigating
committee.24 If the Bibb County grand jury investigation may be equated
with a legislative committee investigation, it ought not to be characterized
as a pending judicial proceeding; but the majority in Wood does not specifi-
cally make this equation.
The question remains what function the Bibb County grand jury was
impaneled to fulfill. The dissenters cite a portion of the jury charge:
Now, gentlemen, it is your duty to develop the facts of this
situation and if there is sufficient evidence of unlawful acts, then
all parties participating, white and colored, candidates or non-
candidates, should be indicted by this Grand Jury so that the guilty
parties, if there are any, may be brought to trial 2 5
With respect to this portion of the charge the investigation appears to be
a judicial proceeding and the state is about to have its day in court. Neither
the majority nor the minority discuss the next ensuing portion of the jury
charge which is as follows:
Furthermore, it is your duty to bring to light those practices
which, while not technically in violation of any law, are yet so
immoral or corrupt as to be destructive of the purposes of our
systems of elections. It is further your right and duty to determine
what additional laws, or amendments to existing laws, are needed to
adequately deal with the situation with which we are faced and to
recommend enactment thereof by the Legislature.26
20 Bridges, supra note 6, at 271.
21 Hale v. Hinkle, 210 U.S. 43, at 59 (1906).
22 Harno, "Some Significant Developments in Criminal Law and Procedure in the
Last Century," 42 J. Crim. L., C & P.S. 427, 450-51 (1951).
23 Ibid. See also Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal 146 (1947),
and National Commission on Law Observation and Enforcement (The Wickersham
Commission), Report on Prosecution 37 (1937).
24 Note, "The Grand Jury as an Investigatory Body," 74 Harv. L. Rev. 590 (1961).
25 Wood, supra note 5, 378 n.2.
26 Ibid.
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This latter portion of the charge clearly gives to the grand jury a function
akin to that of the legislative investigating committee. The substantive evil
to be prevented by the use of the contempt power, the disorderly and unfair
administration of justice, is no longer a potential evil when the grand jury
is fulfilling a non-judicial function. The non-judicial responsibilities of the
Bibb County grand jury become more significant where, as here, the charge
impliedly authorizes the jury to issue a public report without returning any
indictments.2 7 If a grand jury is permitted to investigate and report on
matters of corruption and immorality in the community, it is functioning
as an agency for the transmission of public opinion into law, and in this
capacity it ought not to be shielded from the ideas and opinions of the mem-
bers of the community2 The scope of the contempt power available to pro-
tect a grand jury conducting a quasi-legislative investigation should decrease
markedly; except with respect to judicial process to compel disclosure of
testimony, the contempt power should disappear altogether. The desirability
of maintaining free expression in matters vital to the community is stressed
in the majority opinion in Wood.
While the nature of the proceeding in Wood reasonably calls for freer
speech, the interest in protecting the particular spokesman may at the
same time be less than in previous cases of contempt by publication decided
by the Court. In the Bridges case the alleged contemner was acting as
spokesman for some twelve thousand members of a C.I.O. union.29 In Times-
Mirror Co. v. Superior Court of California,"° decided together with the
Bridges case, the alleged contemners were the managing editor and the cor-
porate publisher of a newspaper.31 In the Pennekamp case the alleged con-
temners were the associate editor and the corporate publisher of a news-
paper.3 2 In the Craig case the alleged contemners were a news reporter, an
editorial writer, and a publisher-all connected with newspapers.3 3 In the
Wood case the petitioner, the alleged contemner, spoke only in his capacity
as a private citizen.3 4 The inhibition of the occasional utterances of one
27 Diligent research failed to disclose any controlling Georgia statutes or court
decisions. "The majority of courts considering the question have disallowed reports un-
accompanied by an indictment." Note, "The Grand Jury as an Investigatory Body,"
74 Harv. L. Rev. 590, 595 (1961). A federal grand jury could not return a report
without an indictment, because its jurisdiction is coextensive with that of the court
of which it is an appendage, and if there were not enough evidence to return an indict-
ment, there would be no "case or controversy." Application of United Elec. Workers,
111 F. Supp. 858, 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
28 See Application of United Elec. Workers, supra note 27, at 864-65, in which it
is argued that a grand jury ought not to have any quasi-legislative or quasi-executive
functions. The contrary view is expressed in: Note, "The Grand jury as an Investigatory
Body," 74 Harv. L. Rev. 590 (1961).
29 Bridges, supra note 6, at 275.
30 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
31 Id. at 271.
32 Pennekamp, supra note 7, at 333.
33 Craig, supra note 8, at 369.
34 Wood, supra note 5, at 382.
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man speaking only for himself would result in less social harm in terms of
the total dissemination of ideas and opinions than would result from the
inhibition of either a spokesman for a large organization or a newspaper of
daily circulation. The value to the community of the speech protected in
the Wood case is arguably less than the value of the speech protected in
the Bridges, Times-Mirror, Pennekamp, and Craig cases.
An unexpressed factor in the Wood case may have contributed to the
majority decision to protect the accused individual contemner. In Green v.
United States35 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the non-applicability of the
guarantees of the fifth and sixth amendments to summary proceedings for
criminal contempt. Mr. Justice Black, in a dissenting opinion joined by the
Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Douglas, argued that the precedents for the
majority decision were error, that summary contempt proceedings ought to
be abolished, and that contempt proceedings ought to be governed by the
procedural safeguards required by the Constitution. 36 Mr. Justice Black
further observed that:
Within the past few years there has been a tendency on the part
of this Court to restrict the substantive scope of the contempt
power to narrower bounds than had been formerly thought to
exist .... In substantial part this is attributable to a deeply felt
antipathy toward the arbitrary procedures now used to punish
contempts. 7
The Court has, indeed, applied the "clear and present danger" test so as to
restrict the substantive scope of the contempt power. In cases outside of the
contempt area the Court has adopted a restatement of the "clear and present
danger" test. The restatement, as formulated by Judge Learned Hand, em-
phasizes the probability and the gravity of the substantive evil to be pre-
vented.38 The emphasis in the contempt cases remains on the imminence
rather than the probability of the threat to the administration of justice.39
The dissenters in Wood suggest that the majority might be making the test
even more stringent by requiring that for a contempt to be punishable the
threatened substantive evil must actually materialize rather than just be
imminent.40
35 356 U.S. 165 (1958).
36 Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, at 194-95 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
37 Id. at 196 n.5.
38 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, at 510 (1950): "In each case (courts)
must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such
invasion of free speech as is neceseary to avoid the danger."
39 Craig, supra note 8, at 376: "The vehemence of the language used is not
alone the measure of the power to punish for contempt. The fires which it kindles must
constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. The
danger must not be remote or even probable; it must immediately imperil." This
language from Craig was quoted approvingly in Wood, supra note 5, at 385.
For a discussion of the relation between this test and the "clear and present danger"
test to be applied in non-contempt cases see Goldfarb & Donnelly, "Contempt by Pub-
lication in the United States," 24 Modern L. Rev. 239, at 243 (1961).
40 Wood, supra note 5, at 400 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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It has been suggested that the administration of justice might best be
protected by a narrowly drawn contempt statute which simultaneously "pro-
vided certain procedural safeguards for the defendant such as a right of ap-
peal, a jury trial, a trial before a different judge, and a limitation on the
amount of fine or term of imprisonment that could be imposed for viola-
tions." 41 Regardless of whether the absence of such procedural safeguards
was a factor in the Wood case, it was not expressed as a basis for the deci-
sion. The Court did find that the petitioner's statements did not so endanger
the fair and orderly administration of justice as to reqiure inhibition of the
free play of ideas and opinions guaranteed by the first and fourteenth
amendments.
41 Goldfarb & Donnelly, supra note 39, at 254-55.
